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Introduction
Late in the summer of 1988, the rap trio, The Beastie Boys, was set
to record their second album, Paul's Boutique, with the help of the inno-
vative production team, The Dust Brothers. The Beastie Boys chose The
Dust Brothers because the Brothers had developed a reputation for being
masters of "sampling," technologically the cutting-edge, funky, and
fresh force in rap sound.
The fresh edge of sampling, which entails borrowing exact sounds
from earlier recorded works, afforded The Beastie Boys a riveting blend
of rap, funk, and psychedelic music. There was only one problem.
Sampled artists from the distant past were stirring. Many were be-
ginning to question the use of their music in these brazen new songs.
Were the new artists disrespectfully making fun of them? The Beastie
Boys were aware of these rumblings. They turned to their attorney, Ken
Anderson, for help. Anderson, fully cognizant of possible copyright vio-
lations, asked himself what the sampled artists really wanted. He con-
cluded that those artists, primarily from the '60s and early '70s, wanted
respect and recognition most of all. So Anderson, armed with a list that
the trio had compiled of some four hundred samples they wanted to use
in the recording process, phoned or wrote each sampled artist. He man-
aged to clear each sample, for little or no cost.
Unfortunately, Anderson is the exception and not the rule. Many
performers in the music industry do not understand the legal and techni-
cal ramifications of the burgeoning new art form of digital sampling. Dig-
ital sampling reproduces subsets of an existing sound recording for
inclusion into a new sound recording.' Once the existing fragment is
recorded from analog into digital form,2 the resulting stream of numbers
1. Essentially, the process involves recycling fragments of sound, usually recorded earlier
by other musicians. See generally Note, The Copyright Considerations of a New Technological
Use of Musical Performance, 11 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 671 (1988) (authored by Jeffrey
Newton); see also Mathews and Pierce, The Computer as a Musical Instrument, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Feb. 1987, at 126. For a concise and graphic explanation of digital sampling, see
Tomsho, As Sampling Revolutionizes Recording, Debate Grows Over Aesthetics, Copyrights,
Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
A sound recording is defined under the Copyright Act as a "work that result[s] from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompa-
nying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which [it is] embodied." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988).
Phonorecords are defined as "material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The
term 'phonorecord' includes any material object in which the sounds are first fixed." Id.
2. Analog sound is that sound produced through audio tape media, while digital sound is
produced by computer, or stored on a computer chip for recall. Analog sound is captured by
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(representing sonic wave form) can be manipulated in an infinite number
of ways, altering some parameters like pitch, while leaving others, such
as timbre, intact.' The process allows the producer to record a voice or
an instrument, either live or from a previous sound recording, and to
manipulate it with a computer so that it can be played back at any pitch
over the range of a keyboard. Thus, digital sampling allows musicians,
producers, and equipment manufacturers to "borrow" other artists' sig-
nature instrumental or vocal sounds.4
This Note addresses the controversy over appropriation of pre-re-
corded sound in rap, a musical form that combines rhyming with bits
and pieces of music "mixed" together to form the layers of a song. Part
one introduces and explains the history of rap music, followed by an ex-
ploration of the importance of sampling to rap music as well as its
postmodern artistic viability. Next, the legal implications of the Federal
Copyright Act5 (hereinafter "Copyright Act") on the process of digital
sampling are explored. This part will describe what is protectable under
the Copyright Act, as well as what constitutes an infringement of a sound
recording copyright. This Note then considers whether digital sampling
violates the Copyright Act, despite the fact that the technology was non-
existent at the time the statute was enacted and amended. Further, this
Note offers a variety of factors that point to the inappropriateness of liti-
gating digital sampling disputes. Finally, this Note proposes to resolve
the sampling problem through the application of an industry-wide licens-
ing scheme that retains enough flexibility to be specific to each situation
that may arise.
I
History of Rap Music
Rap music existed in practice in the Bronx, New York, many years
before it entered the mainstream American music scene as "new black
American popular music called 'rap.' "6 The art form was created when
local disc jockeys (DJs) teamed up with "MCs" 7 who provided a show,
the use of magnetic tape, on to which air pressure fluctuations are translated into signals that
vary the voltage of the electrical current. Thus the tape is encoded. Alternatively, digital
recording expresses wave-forms in binary numbers. Electrical signals are translated propor-
tional to voltage, which is stored in the computer's memory. This method is utilized on com-
pact discs, and in digital sampling. See Note, supra note 1, at 672-73.
3. Drake, Digital Sampling: Looming Copyright Problem, UPI, May 8, 1987 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Omni file).
4. Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is it Theft?, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
5. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
6. D. Toop, THE RAP ATTACK, AFRICAN JIVE TO NEW YORK HIP-HOP 8 (1984).
7. "MC" is an abbreviation for master of ceremonies.
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creating spoken rhymes, catch phrases, and a commentary about the DJ,
the clientele, and themselves over the mixed music and drum beats 8
"Original" sounds were created by "scratching" 9 on a set of two or three
turntables.
The music the DJs used in the mid 1970's came from highly obscure
and often even secret records.l1 Early on, rappers known as The Force
MD's used scratches to incorporate into their mixes not only other art-
ists' music, but also television theme songs such as those from The Brady
Bunch, The Addams Family, and F-Troop. The group took taped snip-
pets from the T.V. shows and added them to their beats and rhymes."t
In 1979, rap was revolutionized. Two records were released12 in
which the music appropriated was a remix of Chic's then huge and rec-
ognizable disco hit "Good Times" as the backing track.'3 These releases
revolutionized rap because they involved the actual usurpation of previ-
ously recorded material, in contrast to DJs who simply had been playing
the records at various informal gatherings as the MCs rapped over them,
without altering the recording. In regard to the informal earlier activity,
Afrika Bambatta, then a DJ in the Bronx and now a prominent rap re-
cording artist, said,
... I used to play the weirdest stuff at a party.... I would throw a
commercial [into the mix] to cool them out, and then I would play
'Honky Tonk Woman' by the Rolling Stones and just keep the beat
going. I'd play something from metal rock records like Grand Funk
Railroad. 'Inside Looking Out' is just the bass and drumming ...
rrrmmmmmmm... and everybody starts freaking out.
14
8. D. Toop, supra note 6, at 15.
9. Scratching is a technique wherein the DJ manipulates the needle of a record that is
playing, creating an audible sensation. It has been referred to as "the endless high speed col-
laging of musical fragments." Id. at 18.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 26.
12. There is some debate in the music industry as to which record came first, but the
general consensus is that -the first record was by a Brooklyn-based group called Fatback and
their DJ, Big Tim III, recording on the Spring label. This was followed by the "granddaddy"
of rap records, "Rapper's Delight," by The Sugarhill Gang on Sugarhill Records. Id. at 15-16.
13. Id. at 15-16. The music from the Chic song comprised essentially all the music for the
two records discussed supra note 12. The "originality" was provided by scratching and other
assorted special effects. Id. "Sampling has been a natural avenue for rappers since the style
began with artists creating their own lyrics to the accompaniment of cassette tapes of songs or
skeletal rhythm tracks. In some respects rappers were 'sampling' before the term existed since
many early hits in the genre were built around the bass line to 'Good Times' by Chic."
Snowden, Sampling, A Creative Tool or License to Steal?, L. A. Times, Aug. 6, 1989 (Calen-
dar), at 61, col. 1.
14. D. Toop, supra note 6, at 65-66.
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At that point, there was no copyright problem, due to the noncom-
mercial medium in which rap existed. 5 "Rap was a performance me-
dium: It was a throw back to the days when musicians made singles
approximating their live shows."16
Until 1979, the sole documentation of Bronx hip-hop was cassette
tapes. These tapes were either clandestine tapes made by would-be boot-
leggers at parties or tapes made by groups themselves and distributed to
friends. 17 However, as soon as these records were released, a direct con-
flict arose between this practice and the traditional protections afforded
under Copyright Law.' 8 As one author comments, "[t]he concurrent
fashionability of scratch mixing and sampling keyboards like the Emula-
tor and Fairlight has led to creative pillage on a grand scale and caused a
crisis for pre-computer-age concepts of artistic property."' 9 Further, the
advent of the inexpensive and easy to use sampling keyboards provided
rap artists with incredible electronic musical power at their fingertips.2'
It is this environment in which the debate arose over whether sampling
through record scratching and tape loops for use on a new recording
constituted copyright infringement. The controversy has shaken the
legal and musical communities, gaining ever-increasing attention since
the technology was first popularized several years ago. 2 1 The now rou-
15. 17 U.S.C. § 114 operates to limit the penumbra of basic rights afforded the owner of a
copyright. Specifically, performance and reproduction rights are limited. Section 114 makes it
textually clear that there exists no performance right as such in a sound recording. The user
must satisfy license requirements with either Broadcast Music, Inc. or the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers. Both of those artist protection agencies require that a
DJ at a club, for example, have a license for the songs that he performs on any given evening.
These licenses are obtained easily and for nominal fees, effectively keeping such "performance"
outside the realm of copyright law. Thus, recording owners may not sue licensed users for
performance that is done for a profit at a nightclub. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973); see also Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
The case of Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), is particularly
illustrative of the above distinction between commercial and noncommercial performance, as
well as the copyrightability of performance. In Sony, the Court had to decide whether making
unauthorized videotapes of television shows and motion pictures for the purpose of viewing
them at home, at a more convenient time (time shifting), was a copyright infringement. The
Court, per Justice Stevens, held that such use was a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, because it
was a noncommercial, nonprofit activity that the plaintiff failed to prove would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work. Id. at 793-95. By analogy, Bambatta's use of a
song by the Rolling Stones at a party could hardly be said to detract from the commercial
value of the copyrighted song.
16. D. Toop, supra note 6, at 93.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
19. D. Toop, supra note 6, at 153.
20. Sampling is relatively easy for the average person. All a musician has to do is record
into the sampling device an isolated sound from an analog source and then reproduce that
sound on his own recording. See Dupler supra note 4, at 1, col. 3.
21. Soocher, License to Sample, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
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tine and widespread use by rappers of myriad samples of varying length
in their recordings demands that the legality of the practice be addressed.
If sampling is found to violate the Copyright Act, alternatives to ensure
the life of this ever-evolving art form must be considered and
implemented.
II
Sampling as a Postmodern Art Form
Digital sampling expresses postmodernism today in much the same
sense as Andy Warhol's canvases of Campbell's soup cans did in the
1960s. Both methods of artistic expression involve the re-interpretation
of previously documented media in a novel setting. The re-use of existing
material in a new social, political, and intellectual context is a feature of
many forms of postmodern arts practice.22 For example, a visual artist
may attach an old tire to an otherwise one-dimensional painting. Such
artistic manipulation has been referred to as "deconstruction" or "recon-
textualization."23 This socially poignant process forces the viewer or lis-
tener to question and rethink commercial presentation and materialism
in society. However, despite the importance of forging new methods of
perception and analysis, rap music seems to be a ripe area for indirect
censorship through the use of the Copyright Act, perhaps due to the
brazen openness of the taking that occurs in some circumstances.24
Many pro-artist advocates involved in the ongoing sampling debate
feel that all new music comes from old music in some way. They claim
that the "American way" is to err on the side of artistic freedom.25 This
premise has been accorded respect in the Anglo-American judicial sys-
tem by the venerable Justice Story, who stated in Emerson v. Davies,
2 6
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are and can be few, if
any things which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout . . . . [E]ven Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and
proudly our boast as the brightest originals would be found to have
gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge and
classical studies in their days.
27
Justice Story recognized the inevitability of allowing some creative over-
lap in order to preserve the vitality of some forms of expression.
22. See Simpson, Two Aspects of Sampling in the Music Industry, 65 AUSTRALIAN L.J.
771, 771 (1989).
23. Id. at 771.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 100-108.
25. Ken Anderson feels as though the practice should be hailed as artistic expression. See
Considine & Ressner, Larcenous Art? Digital Sampling in the Recording Industry, ROLLING
STONE, June 14, 1990, at 103.
26. 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
27. Id. at 619.
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Aside from advocating postmodern expression, there is another, per-
haps more important, reason for promoting the use of sampling in rap
music. Through this medium, many artists pay homage to the strong
roots of black American music. "There is a shared black pop classicism
in rappers, many of whom look to the late 1960s and early 1970s, partic-
ularly to Jimi Hendrix, Parliament-Funkadelic, Sly Stone, Marvin Gaye,
James Brown, and Bob Marley for both musical and spiritual inspira-
tion."2 Rappers are able to affirm and carry on the historical sounds of
those artists by weaving them into new arrangements. One commentator
argues that it makes sense that during this time of racial embattlement,
black musicians are looking back to the civil rights era for musical inspi-
ration.29 These musicians hark back to a richer, more soulful era.30
III
The Copyright Act
A. What Is Protectable?
The basic requirements for copyrightability are set forth in section
102(a) of the Copyright Act:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.
31
As such, the Copyright Act requires originality and fixation in order to
obtain a copyright, and specifically denies protection to "idea[s], proce-
dure[s], . . . or discovery.
' 32
Authorship under section 102(a) has been defined by courts to de-
scribe the "creator of that work.' ' 33 The section further provides that a
copyright comes into existence by the affirmative act of the author fixing
his or her work in a tangible medium of expression. 34 A work is consid-
ered to have been placed in a tangible medium of expression when it "has
been placed in a relatively stable and permanent embodiment. In effect it
28. See A New Bag For Hip-Hop, New York Newsday, Apr. 19, 1990, Part II, at 11.
29. Id. (quoting jazz drummer Max Roach). This can also be seen in rappers' utilization
of snippets of speeches by Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. See Public Enemy, Fear of a
Black Planet, Def Jam/Columbia Records, 1990; see also Paris, The Devil Made Me Do It,
Tommy Boy Records, 1990.
30. See A New Bag For Hip-Hop supra note 28, at 11. Public Enemy coproducer Keith
Shocklee defends sampling old records by arguing that today's musicians cannot play soul-
fully. Id.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
32. Id. at § 102(b).
33. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1988).
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must be recorded or written in some manner."" This requirement must
be met by the individual author, or by a person authorized by the
author.36
In order to claim copyright, the author's creation must be an origi-
nal work of authorship.37 Basically, an original work is one that is not
copied from another work.38 In the aural medium, it has been argued
that each person's vocalization of a word, note or creation of another
sound is an original expression subject to copyright protection, if duly
fixed in a phonorecord.39 As such, the spectrum of what will be deemed
"original" sound is certainly broad, possibly including a single note.'
The work seeking copyright must fall under the Copyright Act's
definition of a work of authorship. Sound recordings qualify as works of
authorship.4" The standard against which a work shall be judged to be
"of authorship" has been referred to as a de minimis one.42 Nearly all
distinguishable variations made from existing works will constitute suffi-
cient indicia of originality for authorship to attach. 3 As such, a sampler
may argue that he contributed authorship and thus his contribution
should be protected under the Copyright Act.
Courts have cautioned that creative authorship should not be judged
by a standard of artistic merit. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.," Justice Holmes stated that judges should not substitute their own
views of artistic merit when deciding questions of authorship. "It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to consti-
tute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits.'
45
35. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 31 (1990).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976).
37. This standard of originality is not textually apparent in the current statute because the
Copyright Act intended to incorporate the standard of originality as established under the
1909 Act. Id. at 51.
38. M. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 35.
39. See generally Comment, Digital Sampling: Old-Fashioned Piracy Dressed up in Sleek
New Technology, 8 Loy. ENT. L.J. 297 (1988) (authored by J.C. Thorn).
40. Professor Nimmer states, "[Though the answer is not entirely without doubt, it
would seem that any instrumental performance, or vocal rendition, contains something which
is irreducible, and thus may be the subject of copyright." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 2.10[A], at 2-145, -146 (1989).
41. Works of authorship under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) include the following: "(1) literary
works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings." Id. This list is not exclusive.
42. M. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 36.
43. Id.
44. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
45. Id. at 251.
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Provided that they satisfy the above requirements of originality and
authorship, sound recordings are copyrightable because they meet the
final criteria that requires a work to be fixed in a tangible medium.'
Since sound recordings must, by definition, be recorded on a tape, disk,
phonorecord, or similar object, they meet the tangible medium require-
ment out of necessity.47 Only sound recordings fixed in a tangible me-
dium on or after Feb. 15, 1972 are protected by the Copyright Act.4"
B. Infringement
The traditional test of copyright infringement requires proof of own-
ership and copying.49 The determination of ownership includes the is-
sues of originality and copyrightability (4e., is the work itself
copyrightable?). Copying is generally proven by establishing access and
substantial similarity between the two works. 50
A plaintiff can prove access by showing that the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to see or copy the work in question. Access is a
question for the jury, with the standard of "reasonable probability."5
Substantial similarity refers to the level of similarity between the
plaintiff's work and the allegedly infringing work. In order to under-
stand the concept of substantial similarity and its application to digital
sampling, the Copyright Act itself must be textually examined.
Infringement, as defined by Congress, results whenever "all or any
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
recording are reproduced." 52 While substantial similarity is an essential
element of a case to prove copying,53 the actual determination of whether
or not a work is substantially similar to a copyrighted work has puzzled
many legal scholars. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,54 Judge
Learned Hand recognized that the line of similarity "wherever drawn
will seem arbitrary."55 The context of sampling appears to afford no fur-
ther insight into a definition of substantial similarity, particularly due to
the computerized alteration and sometimes unrecognizable dissemination
of the original work by the sampler.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
49. M. NIMMER, supra note 40, § 13.01.
50. See LATMAN, GORMAN & GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 402 (1989).
51. M. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 266-67.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976); see Note supra note 1, at 706.
53. M. NIMMER, supra note 40, § 13.03(A).
54. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
55. Id. at 122.
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The issue of substantial similarity raises a number of questions in
sound recording cases. 56 Many of these questions were addressed in
United States v. Taxe," wherein the defendant re-recorded music from
records and tapes, adding new sounds and changing speed, reverberation,
and volume. The court used the test of substantial similarity to hold that
defendant's "piracy" had indeed infringed plaintiff's copyright.58 How-
ever, the court failed to explain how the substantial similarity test should
be applied in the sound recording context. As such, there appears to be
some degree of confusion in the courts on the issue.59 A digital sample is
almost a per se admission of "similarity" in the sense that it is indeed the
actual sound that is being appropriated. Thus, the Taxe court would
probably leave the question of appropriation to the trier of fact, with the
only instruction being to determine whether or not the defendant had
indeed utilized the "actual" sound of the plaintiff, as pronounced in sec-
tion 114(b) of the Copyright Act.6'
Law review writers have generally argued that digital sampling is
directly in violation of section 114(b) of the Copyright Act and therefore
should be prohibited.6 The logic behind these arguments is essentially
that section 114(b), by the inclusion of the word "actual," expressly pro-
hibits lifting the exact sound of a copyrighted work.62
56. A finding of substantial similarity is merely an evidentiary device to allow an inference
of copying. A.B.A., COMMITEE REPORTS, SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPY-
RIGHT LAW § 306-B-1, at 90:160 [hereinafter ABA COMMITTEE REPORT]; see Snowden supra
note 13, at 61, col. 4. "'Copyright infringement is a strange area because there's no set
amount of timing of music that constitutes a violation,' said Richard Grabel, a New York
music attorney and former rock critic. 'The basic legal standard is substantial similarity ...
there's a threshold and if you cross it, bang, you're guilty. If you stay just shy of that thresh-
old, you're using the common language of pop music.'" Id., at 61, col. 4.
57. 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
58. Id. at 965.
59. See generally Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723 (1987) (authored by
Bruce J. McGiverin); see also Comment, supra note 39. Even Professor Nimmer, in his dis-
cussion of the application of the substantial similarity test, does not explain how it should be
applied in sound recording cases as opposed to cases dealing with written media. M. NIMMER,
supra note 39 at § 13.03 (1989).
60. Telephone interview with Ken Anderson, Nov. 10, 1990.
61. See generally Note, The Substantial Similarity Test and its Use in Determining Copy-
right Infringement Through Digital Sampling, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 509
(1990) (authored by Maura Giannini). See also Note, Digital Sound Sampling Copyright and
Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, supra note 59; Comment,
You Can't Always Get What You Want But Digital Sampling Can Get What You Need, 22
AKRON L. REV. 691 (1989) (authored by Ronald Mark Wells).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) reads in pertinent part: "The exclusive right of the owner of a
copyright in a sound recording ... is limited to the right to duplicate that sound recording in
the form of phonorecords ... that directly or indirectly capture the actual sounds fixed in the
recording." (Emphasis added)
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Although digital sampling involves taking the exact sound, artists
will often filter the sound, scratch it up, or further manipulate the sound
until it is no longer recognizable. Also, if one takes into consideration
the technological possibilities of digital sampling, there may be instances
when there is a quantum of sound so de minimis that it may be taken
from a sound recording without violating existing copyright laws.63 This
issue has not been addressed by any court or statute. However, the Taxe
court surmised in dicta that a trivial re-recording might be such an insub-
stantial taking that it does not constitute an infringement. It can be in-
ferred from the opinion that the taking of a few notes may be without
merit, and thus not necessarily copyrightable."
Finally, there appears to be a dichotomy in section 114 of the Copy-
right Act between re-recordation, which is protectable, and mere imita-
tion, which is not.65 Some commentators have argued that digital
sampling is more imitative than duplicative because of the fact that sam-
ples are generally altered and as such not re-recorded verbatim.66 It has
been further argued that the above distinction reflects the legislative in-
tent that the originality of a recording artist is the main feature to be
protected.67 If it is accepted that sampling is different from mere re-
recordation, then it follows that sampling affords the modem musician a
valuable tool for artistic expression. Accordingly, sampling is not pro-
scribed under the Copyright Act.
68
In any event, an important legislative intention is to balance the
rights held by the owner of the copyright with the right of the public to
enjoy new works. 69 This should logically extend to sound recordings as
63. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. '1976); cert. denied 429 U.S. 1040
(1977). One commentator feels that Taxe, although holding against record pirates, ruled that
the issue of literal copying will not be held to be an automatic infringement because the copy-
ing under Taxe must be substantially similar to the original recording as a whole. As such, the
case can be interpreted as recognizing that certain snippets will be held de minimis. Telephone
interview with Ken Anderson, supra note 60.
64. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 965. "we believe the [jury] instruction went beyond the law insofar
as it purported to characterize any and all re-recordings as infringements, but the subsequent
inclusion of a comparison test permitted the jury to consider substantial similarity." Id. The
fact that defendant in Taxe was a seller of pirated records explains why the court did not
inquire into whether defendant's works were mere unprotectable imitations because defendant
had clearly re-recorded substantially qualitative copyrighted works verbatim.
65. Idr at 965 n.2. See generally Comment, Digital Sampling and Signature Sound, 61 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SP. L. REv 71-4 (1989) (authored by Thomas Am).
66. See Comment supra note 65, at 71-74.
67. Id. at 80.
68. Id. at 81.
69. The Copyright Act was framed to "accomplish the double purpose of securing to the
composer an adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same time prevent
the formation of oppressive monopolies .. " Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 164 (1975) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909)).
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they are defined by the Copyright Act as "works of authorship. '7° As
the Supreme Court stated in Twentieth Century v. Aiken,7
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of litera-
ture, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to serve a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.72
Thus, recognizing rap sampling as contributing significantly to the pub-
lic interest, as well as allowing creative expression, should affect the
above balance of interests in favor of unrestricted expression.
C. Applying Low Tech Law to High Tech Music
The Supreme Court, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios Inc.,73 recognized the inherent interplay between technological ad-
vancements and copyright law:
From its beginning the law of copyright has developed in response to
significant changes in technology. 4 [Flor example, the development
and marketing of player pianos and perforated rolls of music... pre-
ceded the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909; [and] innovations
in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory exemption for library
copying embodied in section 108 of the 1976 revision of the Copyright
Act.
7 5
Justice Stevens explains that it was the invention of a new form of copy-
ing, the printing press, that gave rise to the original need for copyright
protection.76 "Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this
country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that
new technology made necessary."' 77 Stevens recognized, however, the in-
ability of the legislature to predict future advancements.
The Copyright Act was first promulgated by Congress in 1909.
When enacted, the legislature intended the Act to apply to situations and
artistic mediums then in existence that it could adequately address.78
This inability to foresee future innovations was not without its conse-
70. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
71. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
72. Id. at 156.
73. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
74. Id. at 430.
75. Id. at 430 n. 11.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 430-31.
78. 1 N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS, AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD.
INTRODUCTION xvi (1978).
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quences. As technology advanced, many disputes arose, raising ques-
tions about the applicability of the Act to novel situations. For example,
in a 1968 case, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,7 9 involving
the use of alternative cable systems to receive basic television stations in
hilly West Virginia,8 0 the Supreme Court stated, in reference to the then
pertinent Act of 1909:
Our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative his-
tory, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the development
of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here. In 1909 radio
itself was in its infancy, and television had not been invented. We must
read the statutory language of 60 years ago in light of drastic techno-
logical change.
8 1
The Supreme Court recognized in Fortnightly that any statutory analysis
of a technological advancement would require a consideration of the po-
tential inappropriateness of strict statutory construction.
8 2
Similarly, in Goldstein v. California,3 the Court cautioned against
statutory analysis that did not adequately address rapid technological
change:
To interpret accurately Congress' intended purpose in passing the 1909
Act and the meaning of the House Report... we must remember that
our modem technology differs greatly from that which existed in 1909.
The Act and the House Report should not be read as if they were
written today, for to do so would inevitably distort their intended
meaning; rather, we must read them against the background of 1909 in
which they were written.
8 4
Relaxing the literal terms of the Act in response to technological changes
appears to be a necessary step for any judiciary when dealing with a pro-
cess that could not have been portended by an acting body of law mak-
ers. "When technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of.. .[its]
basic purpose."8 5 The modern surge in communications and information
recordation has produced doctrinal tensions in copyright law that are
likely to increase in the near future. Consequently, copyright law is be-
coming unmanageable for both copyright owners and the public.
79. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
80. Id. at 391-92.
81. Id. at 395-96.
82. Id.
83. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
84. Id. at 564. See also Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings Inc., 506
F.2d 392, 397-401 (3rd Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
85. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The basic pur-
pose referred to in the case is to "stimulate artistic creativity for general public good." Id. This
purpose essentially is consistent with the framer's intention to "promote science and the useful
arts." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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Digital sampling is a relatively recent phenomenon, not appearing
until several years after the passage of the 1976 revision of the Copyright
Act. As explained in Part I, rappers used techniques such as scratching
and rapping over copyrighted records long before the advent of digital
sampling.8 6 Once sampling keyboards were introduced in the early
1980's, it became apparent to many rappers that the keyboards could be
used to accelerate the recording process as well as open up whole new
avenues of sound.17 In adopting the machines as part and parcel of their
recording process, rappers hardly realized that they were testing the ap-
plicability of the Copyright Act to the recently developed digital sampler.
Attorney Ken Anderson feels that there is no such thing as "predic-
tive legislative intent"8 8 in the law of copyright. Mr. Anderson believes
that new technologies, such as digital sampling, are inapplicable to statu-
tory copyright legislation and should, therefore, be dealt with by other
means. 89
Record producer Arif Mardin states, "You can't stop technol-
ogy.... It moves too fast and the laws don't keep up. Some people still
don't understand exactly what sampling is, and maybe new laws will
have to wait until there is a greater awareness."'" Even the American
Bar Association Committee on Broadcasting, Recording, and Perform-
ing Artists stated that "[tihe lack of case law specifically addressing the
issues [of digital sampling] and the increasing use of digital technology in
the sound recording industry presents [sic] a situation that would benefit
from clarifying legislation." 91
A clarification in the legislation would update the Copyright Act92
so that it would apply to digital sampling. However, as it exists today,
the Act does not apply to sampling. One commentator suggests, "Sound
sampling is the epitome of technology trying to squeeze into copyright
law where it just does not fit." 93
86. See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
87. See D. TooP supra note 6, at 156.
88. Telephone interview with Ken Anderson, supra note 60.
89. Id. Mr. Anderson feels as though some sort of licensing scheme would be the best
method of dealing with the myriad conflicts that are arising in this area. See infra Part V.
90. Dupler, supra note 4, at 74, col. 1.
91. ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 56, at 164.
92. Specifically § 114(b)'s applicability to digital sampling disputes. As the section stands
now, it is restrictive, as well as ambiguous, in the use of the word "actual" in relation to what
is copyrightable. As explained in the text infra, this is due to the inability of the legislature to
portend future technological advancements. However, now that sampling has become a major
issue, it may benefit from congressional clarification.
93. Digital Sampling, Cheered, Jeered, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 23, 1986, Tempo, at 10
(quoting William Krasilovsky, lawyer and co-author of THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC).
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As it stands, the practice of sampling has crossed the actionable
boundary of the revised Copyright Act and as such must be dealt with
either by a clarification in legislation or by some method other than liti-
gation. Eric Greenspan, attorney for many rappers, including
Stetsasonic, argues that "[t]he Copyright Act never considered sampling
... [w]hat we are trying to do is interpret old laws under new circum-
stances. The problem is that technology is growing faster than lawyers
and managers can react."94
Thus, if digital sampling cases get as far as a courtroom, it appears
inappropriate to apply the current section 114(b) of the Copyright Act.
However, as the next Part of this Note details, cases involving sampling
are either being settled or not pursued, for a variety of reasons. Thus
applicability of the Copyright Act has not been tested in a digital sam-
pling case.
IV
Sampling Cases Are Not Reaching the Courtroom
A. Many in the Recording Industry Are Reluctant to Litigate
Sampled artists and their representatives, usually their publisher or
record companies, have been reluctant to bring suits against samplers for
a variety of reasons. Record companies that represent sampled artists
worry about one day being sued themselves. Attorneys that represent
companies and their sampled artists realize that an unfortunate prece-
dent may be set if a court decides to rule either that the taking was de
minimis or that it constituted a fair use. If the latter, loss of value to the
sampled artist will be difficult to prove.95 It is likely that a judicial deci-
sion in this area would operate in a vacuum, offering no guidelines for
artists and their representatives.
In the music world it is increasingly apparent that the axiom "to-
day's plaintiff may be tomorrow's defendant" is a reality for digital sam-
plers. Copyright owners of sound recordings are not claiming their legal
remedy against samplers. This phenomenon can be attributed to several
factors. A company that itself has artists under contract who sample,
aside from the possibility of having to overcome a defense of "unclean
hands" in a sampling action, is unlikely to sue another record label
whose copyrights it may want to use in the future.96 This decision not to
enforce artist's copyrights based on a large scale corporate financial deci-
94. Considine & Ressner, supra note 25, at 103 col. 2.
95. Zimmerman, Old Is New Again in the World of Sampling, Variety, Aug. 1st, 1990, at
69, col.3.
96. S. Gordon & C. Sanders, Roadblocks to Legal Protection in Sampling, N.Y. L.J., May
19, 1989 at 5, col. 1.
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sion may be inherently unfair to the sampled artist. However, in reality,
record companies are attempting to be cost effective and are advising
against enforcement of rights because they do not wish to be sued by
other similarly situated companies.97
Attorney Lionel Sobel, editor of The Entertainment Law Reporter,
believes that companies are motivated to steer clear of actual litigation
because they themselves currently have artists under contract who are
sampling.9" Thus, record companies are generally avoiding what would
be a rather expensive "vicious circle." Rather than sue each other con-
tinually, companies have chosen not to pursue litigation.99
A few cases have been brought despite the above considerations.
Those cases have settled rather quickly, however. Rappers De La Soul"o°
appropriated part of "You Showed Me," a top ten hit by The Turtles in
1969,101 and used it as a tape loop, replaying segments for more than a
minute."12 Mark Volman, a Turtles vocalist, heard the song as it was
reworked into De La Soul's "Transmitting Live From Mars."103 Vol-
man sued De La Soul and their label, Tommy Boy, for $1.7 million,
claiming that the defendants had knowingly used the sample without au-
thorization and thus violated his copyright."°' The suit was settled im-
mediately for an undisclosed amount.'05
In. other actions, the Beastie Boys and their label Def Jam"° 6 were
sued by artist Jimmy Castor over the alleged use of Castor's material
from the mid 1970s. The Beastie Boys, represented by Ken Anderson,
97. Id.
98. Tomsho, supra note 1, at B4, col. 3.
99. See Gordon & Sanders supra note 100, at 5, col. 1.
100. The group De La Soul is represented by Tommy Boy Records. The group's "critically
acclaimed gold album, Three Feet High and Rising, has been hailed as a watershed in the
creative use of sampling. The first side alone contained pieces of TV game show themes and
the Steely Dan song 'Peg,' James Brown rhythm tracks and hard rock guitar licks, the 'Chop-
sticks' theme, and what could be the bass line to 'Stand By Me,' along with literally dozens of
other snippets that are maddeningly familiar but difficult to identify." See Snowden supra note
13, at 61, col. 1.
101. See Considine & Ressner supra note 25, at 103.
102. De La Soul used a four bar section of the Turtles' song (lasting twelve seconds) and
"looped" it so that the riff served as the music for the entire 66 seconds of the De La Soul song.
See Snowden supra note 13, at 61, col. 2.
103. The song appeared on De La Soul's album, Three Feet High and Rising.
104. Volman, who sued as "Flo and Eddie Inc.," actually used the California equivalent of
the Sound Recording Act, which provides that the "author of sound recording has exclusive
ownership." CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2)(West 1989).
105. See Tomsho supra note 1, at B4, col. 2.
106. Def Jam was Rick Rubin's label which has now split, with Rubin taking the name Def
American. The Beastie Boys have since had disagreements with Rubin and signed with
Warner Brothers, but the samples in question were contained on Licensed to III, an album
released by Def Jam in 1986. Telephone interview with Jennifer Murillo, assistant publicist at
Def American Records, Los Angeles, Califorfiia, Apr. 26, 1991.
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admitted the takings in the action against Castor, as well as in another
action, yet both cases were settled well before trial.1 7 Mr. Anderson
believes that both sides felt the pursuit of the matters in court was the
least cost effective alternative the parties faced.108
B. Fair Use
In general, a sampler would prefer not to risk a case that would
make some uses impossible or increase licensing costs. °9 Under the fair
use doctrine, 110 however, he or she may be able to sample without taking
these risks. If the doctrine is found applicable by a court, owners of sam-
pled material would lose a large portion of revenue."'
Under the fair use doctrine, a fair use of a copyrighted work is per-
mitted without the owner's consent, because the use does not detract
from the copyrighted work's value or unfairly compete with that work.
The doctrine is flexible and "permits courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
that the law was designed to foster." ' 2 In determining whether the use
is fair, courts consider various factors, including those expressly stated in
the Copyright Act in section 107.113
The first component considered is the purpose and nature of the use.
This essentially involves a commercial/noncommercial determination.
First, a commercial use negates a finding of fair use, because it will pre-
sumptively capitalize on the copyrighted work. Commercial use is not,
however, fatal to a fair use defense. 1 4 Second, courts consider the nature
of the disputed work to determine whether the use is creative rather than
informative. Third, a court will consider the amount and substantiality
of the portion used (sampled, in our case). This test is qualitative as well
107. Soocher, supra note 21, at 26 (citing Castor v. Rubin, 87 Civ. 6159 and Thomas v.
Diamond, 87 Civ. 7048 (two Manhattan federal district court cases)).
108. See telephone interview with Ken Anderson supra note 60, see also Zimmerman supra
note 95, at 69, col. 3-4. "Larry Stanley, director of business affairs at Tommy Boy ... agrees,
saying the whole situation is about negotiation power. 'The plaintiffs are afraid because they
could lose their muscle. They can use their copyright for negotiating power and threaten to
sue, and they could win a big judgment of treble damages. But the court might say that three
or four bars from a song is not enough [to establish infringement].... [The defendant] might
take the stance of 'we're only sampling half a bar or three notes, so sue us.' The judge might
say that those three notes are enough and then the defendant has no negotiating power.' "Id.
at 69, col. 3.
109. See infra Part V on licensing of samples.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
111. See Zimmerman supra note 95, at 69, col. 4.
112. Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Brdcst. Corp., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
114. M. NIMMER, supra note 40, § 13.05[A], at 72-73.
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as quantitative.' 15 In other words, a sample may be substantial regardless
of its length. 116
Last, and perhaps most applicable to the sampling debate, section
107 calls for courts to consider the likely effect which the use of the copy-
righted material will have on the potential market for the copyrighted
work.' 7 A court will likely consider this to be the most important factor
in determining if the use is fair. " I8 This factor may serve as a deterrent to
litigation because it would be hard for a prospective plaintiff, such as The
Turtles, to claim that the value of their original 1969 hit'1 9 was dimin-
ished by the sampler's use of it twenty years later. In fact, the sampler
may actually add to the value of the original work because he has ex-
posed it to a wider market, or rekindled interest in it, prompting addi-
tional purchases.
The recognition by the Court in Harper and Row Publishers Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises 120 that the fourth prong will be the most important
consideration to users12' (samplers), does not, by itself, absolve a rapper
defendant from satisfying the other factors of a fair use defense.
Authors Lawrence and Timberg, however, in an extensive treatise
on fair use,' 22 argue that "two of the tests of fair use, the substantiality of
the copying, and the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy do not
function well for non-literary media."'' 2a Lawrence and Timber further
argue that
"the fairest and most satisfying approach to the problem [of fair use] is
the one inherent in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution 124 which
states that the purpose of the copyright law is to 'promote the
[P]rogress of [S]cience and the useful [A]rts.' ,,125
115. See Latman supra note 50, at 37.
116. Id.
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (last fair use consideration).
118. "Finally the Act focuses on 'the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.' This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985).
119. Most samples are taken from rock or funk records from the mid '60s to the mid '70s.
However, there has been an increasing trend of rappers sampling each other. See generally
Considine & Ressner supra note 25.
120. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
121. Id. at 566.
122. 2 J.S. LAWRENCE & B.TIMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY (1989).
123. Id. at 317.
124. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
125. 2 LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 122, at 317. The authors explain: "[T]o say
that copyright owners are generally entitled to a reward for their labors does not mean that
they are entitled to the kind of reward that would frustrate the constitutional purpose to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts." Id at 318.
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Lawrence and Timberg believe that the test of fair use is faulty. Ideally,
it should take into account factors other than the commercial quality of
the use.'26 This proposed change favors the sampler by removing the
commercial gain factor, which may defeat a fair use defense. Lawrence
and Timberg argue that courts, in passing upon particular claims of in-
fringement, must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest
in being protected to the greater public interest in "advancement and
development of the arts."' 127 The authors propose a radical alteration of
section 107. The proposed alteration would inquire whether the artist
(sampler) is "within a class of persons engaged in the advancement of...
the arts ... or ideas deserving first amendment protection," 12 and bal-
ance that concern against the effect on the copyrighted artist's work.
Under the proposed test, a court would inquire whether the copier (sam-
pler) stands to substantially profit from the use. If the court decides that
there should be some compensation, it will not be in the traditional form
of inflated money damages, but rather it will exist as a license, with nomi-
nal payment according to the amount of work absconded.
129
V
Proposal: A Voluntary and Cooperative Scheme for
Licensing with Negotiation Guidelines
A. Considerations and Examples of the Sampling Problem
The dilemmas outlined above point to the fact that the music indus-
try must find some method of dealing with the widespread use of digital
sampling. The solution will no doubt be found outside the realm of the
statutory law as it exists today. Rather, both parties to these disputes,
the sampled and the sampler, must come together in a cooperative spirit
and resolve these disputes. This will result in a reduction of legal costs
for both parties. Also, the animosity that can so easily develop in a con-
text such as digital sampling, due to the appropriation of sound without
credit, can be eliminated.
As noted above, one of the crucial elements involved in a fair use
analysis is the determination of whether the "infringing" artist stands to
profit from the use of a copyrighted work. Commentators 130 are in ac-
cord that the determination of profit should be linked to the determina-
tion of payment. However, the question of how payment is to be
126. Id. at 317.
127. Id. at 318; see also Berlin v. E.C. Publications Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
128. 2 LAWRENCE & TIMBERG, supra note 122, at 319.
129. Id. at 319. Here Lawrence and Timberg speak of "appropriate" provisions for the
payment of copyright royalties.
130. See, e.g., 2 LAWRENCE & TIMBERG supra note 122, at 319.
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determined is a complex one that signals the starting point of the devel-
opment of a licensing scheme for digital sampling. As one author states,
If the use is sufficiently profitable and the copying has been quite sub-
stantial, then the copyright owner should in equity be compensated for
such use. Admittedly this recommendation will sometimes be difficult
to apply: How are reasonable royalties to be determined? When are
they to be paid? It is hoped that the procedure for implementing this
proposal will not involve legislation or judicial intervention, but will be
based on industry-wide negotiations to establish formulas that will not
be onerous to the user and will be fair to the copyright owner. 3 '
This author shares the view of many pro-artist, fair use defense ad-
vocates. A licensing scheme is preferable to litigation. and can only be
effective if it cooperatively takes into account the basic needs of both
parties; the sampled artist's need for compensation and recognition of
his or her original creativity132 as well as the sampler's need for artistic
expression at a fair cost. These conflicting interests can be accommo-
dated in the negotiation process. Also, these needs should ideally reflect
the founders' goals for copyright law, as set forth in the Constitution, to
"promote ... Science and ... useful Arts,"' 33 while, at the same time,
allowing reasonable financial and actual recognition for the original artis-
tic creation of the sampled artist.
Many sampling artists, following the advice of their attorneys, pay
flat fees or a percentage of their royalties to the original artists or their
labels and publishers. For instance, the New York based rap group
Stetsasonic constructed a song in spirited defense of sampling and rap
music. The song was woven around music taken from funk artist Lonnie
Liston Smith's 1975 piece, "Expansions." Before recording their song,
Stetsasonic negotiated with Smith and struck an agreement to pay the
sampled artist three thousand dollars for the full ownership of the copy-
right to "Expansions." Stetsasonic recognized the possibility of some
legal wrangling in the future, and therefore obtained permission from
Smith to avoid future legal expenses."' De La Soul, the defendant in
one lawsuit already,13 decided to avoid legal problems with the '70s funk
magnate George Clinton by paying him a flat rate of one cent per album.
Clinton is also receiving half of the publishing royalties.'
36
131. Id. at 324.
132. For example, the pop rapper Vanilla Ice has recently settled with Rob Parissi, the
singer-songwriter behind Wild Cherry. Ice sampled the song "Play That Funky Music White
Boy." Parissi is willing to settle, and expressed the non financial desire to receive credit for the
sample. San Francisco Chron., Jan. 30, 1991, Datebook, at 1, col. 3.
133. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
134. See Soocher supra note 21, at 26.
135. See supra Part IV.
136. Newman, NMS Panel Legally, There Are No Free Samples, BILLBOARD, Aug. 12,
1989, at 24.
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Ken Anderson, as noted earlier, in his duties as attorney for the
Beastie Boys, spent many hours calling artists in order to "clear" the
myriad samples that appeared on the 1989 album, Paul's Boutique. Mr.
Anderson related that most of those samples were cleared for free, in-
cluding one that was the property of the estate of the Reggae star Bob
Marley. Mr. Anderson believes that most sampled artists merely want
admission of sampling and recognition.
1 37
The above examples illustrate that communication with artists and
their representatives should be established and that licenses or clearances
should be obtained. However, there does not appear to be any industry-
wide standard of cooperation. Such cooperation would only exist if every
sampler were willing to obtain clearance for all of his recognizable and
willful samples, no matter how small.
Perhaps one of the reasons why all members of the industry are not
cooperating is the ambiguity in the Copyright Act which causes fear re-
garding litigation. Attorney Robert Weiner, a copyright lawyer who rep-
resents many samplers and sampled artists, said,
Working out a legal defense for clients concerned about crossing the
line of copyright is tricky business.... Do I advise them to go to the
music publisher or the record company? Most lawyers will tell their
clients not to ask for legal permission because if they get turned down
and sued then it is intentional infringement.
1 38
Similar fear is widespread throughout the industry. However, it can
be alleviated by the introduction of a scheme that all members of the
industry would be willing to follow. Such a scheme cannot be compul-
sory, as that would require absolute cooperation of all in the industry,
139
and may need to be statutory in order to be implemented. 4° Rather, the
best method in this embryonic and unpredictable era of sampling would
be a voluntary scheme, which, if effective over an extended period of
time, could then be reported to Congress and the Copyright Office with
the goal of possibly amending the Copyright Act to apply to digital
sampling.
137. Telephone interview with Ken Anderson, supra note 60.
138. Lawyers Debate, The Legal Realities of an Emerging New Art Form, BACK STAGE,
Oct. 27, 1989, at 34.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 115 deals with compulsory licenses. Such schemata may prove useful to
the sampling context in the future, but an attempt at voluntary licensing seems adequate now.
A compulsory system would require the absolute recordation of every sample as well as the
intervention of ASCAP and BMI.
140. For example, Ken Anderson cautions against their use in the sampling context be-
cause the process is in its implementing stages and therefore rigid compulsory schemata may
not be flexible enough for an area that is now far from concrete. Telephone interview with
Ken Anderson, supra note 60.
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In the context of the development of such a voluntary scheme it
should be cautioned that U.S. antitrust laws preclude price fixing ar-
rangements.' 4 ' However, price fixing can be avoided by the inclusion of
a noncompulsory open schedule of payments, based on the agreement of
the parties. The only way in which the industry would face an antitrust
violation would be if record companies had a broad "sampling treaty"
that provided for a rigid royalty rate schedule.
42
B. Scheme
The scheme itself involves a process to be undertaken by artists and
their managements when the artists wish to engage in sampling. Follow-
ing the scheme could result in the avoidance of costly litigation or other
complications.
Samplers should prepare a list of all of the reasonably recognizable
samples that they use on their recordings. 43 Samplers or their represent-
atives should attempt to obtain clearances without payment for all sam-
ples listed, as there will be no need to pay for the samples in situations
where the sampled artist agrees to the proposed use at no cost. Samplers
should then obtain a mechanical licensing agreement for those samples
cleared.'" Samplers and sampled artists should then negotiate payment
schedules, specific to each particular situation, and dependent on such
factors as the amount of work taken and the realistic expectations of
sampled artists regarding compensation. 4 ' Copyright owners should
give all requests reasonable consideration and provide licenses at a fair
and reasonable rate. ' 46 Good faith and fair dealing, as well as respect for
the artistic integrity of both the sampled artist and the sampler, should
characterize all dealings between the parties. Finally, intra-party deter-
minations should exist to delegate who should bear the cost of the li-
cense, the artist, or the record company. 1
47
141. See Theatre Enter. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Inter-
state Circuit Inc. v. United States., 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
142. See Gordon & Sanders supra note 96, at 5, col. 1.
143. Tommy Boy Records routinely asks the artist or producer of a record to list every
sample on the record, no matter how obscure or difficult to hear. Then the new record is
compared to the source recording in order to determine what needs clearance. Zimmerman,
supra note 95, at 87.
144. This process may necessarily be part and parcel of the clearance process anyway.
145. For instance, if a record is very old and was never successful, and it is apparent that
the artist is simply attempting to capitalize on a potentially favorable situation, this should be
taken into account in determining payment.
146. Other authors have proposed such a contingency. See Gordon & Sanders supra note
96, at 6, col. 3. These authors also point out that all licensing requests should be made in
writing. Id.
147. "The record companies argue that these payments are in the nature of recording costs
and therefore should be paid from the artist's share of the income. The artists argue that this
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This scheme should adequately consider the two sets of rights being
determined in the sampling context: those of the copyright owner of the
master recording and those of the owner of the newly recorded song.
The cost of clearances and licenses will depend on a number of com-
ponents, such as whether the song is used as a single or as an album
track, how important a part the use plays in the new composition, how
many times the sample is repeated in the sampler's work, and whether
the use is offensive to the holder of the copyright.
Any scheme must also take into account both the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), and Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. (BMI). The primary objective of these organizations is the pro-
tection of the rights of artists, and, as expected, they have both developed
digital sampling policies. BMI waits until works are reported to them
and then instructs parties how to split royalties. 14 ASCAP takes a differ-
ent approach. The society regularly tapes radio broadcast performances,
which it analyzes in order to credit sampled artists.149 This method has
shortcomings in the rap world because much of rap is not played on the
radio, regardless of substantial sales, because of graphic depictions of
street life and strong political undertones.
Ideally, under the above outlined scheme, samplers will report all
samples to the sampled artists so there will be no need for the sort of
policing that ASCAP is currently undertaking. If so, the industry-wide
cooperation regarding the above scheme will provide benefits. Following
the scheme can result in fair payments and recognition to older sampled
artists, as well as avoid possible suits where a "washed up" artist is able
to take a huge amount of money from a currently profitable rap band. In
other words, the scheme allows the sampled artist to receive a fair pay-
ment, while preventing the original artist from walking away with a
windfall.
In order to illustrate the probable result of noncooperation, the re-
cent story of the group Milli Vanilli can be examined. The group used an
old Blood Sweat and Tears song on their polished 1989 hit "All or Noth-
ing" and refused to give the sampled band credit. While it was recently
uncovered that the group did not perform on the entire album, they nev-
ertheless are being sued by the sampled artist as a "party to the fraud"
allows companies to take the risk of not obtaining clearances... then in the event that a claim
is made, the company simply settles the matter, using the artists' royalties when they accrue."
Simpson, supra note 22, at 772.
148. For example, De La Soul, after clearing samples with the original writer, tells BMI
how to split the royalties. BMI generally has the song's copyright, so if only instrumentals are
sampled the original writer may not be needed. See Zimmerman supra note 95, at 87, col. 2.
149. Id.
1991]
that denied credit for the sample. ' 50 Accordingly, samplers should abso-
lutely admit their samples to avoid being sued for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and copyright violation. Admission and fair negotiations
between the parties could lead to the solution of the sampling problem
and avoid costly litigation.
VI
Conclusion
Digital sampling is a controversial practice that is incompatible with
the Copyright Act. However, the solution to the problem does not lie in
litigation. Those that have sued have realized the pitfalls of litigation,
which include great cost, unclear applicability of law, and possible de-
fenses (e.g., fair use and contribution of authorship that samplers may
utilize effectively). A scheme of licensing based on good faith and fair
dealing would solve the problems of both adversaries in the sampling
dispute. Sampled artists would get fair financial rewards and recogni-
tion, while samplers would have free artistic reign without facing the pos-
sibility of a large judgment against them. Industry-wide adherence to a
licensing scheme would enable rappers to express their artistic creativity
while reflecting musically upon their rich culture.
150. R. Guilliatt, Illusions and Lawsuits Rock the Video Age, The Independent, Dec. 9,
1990, at 14.
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